THE WAR IN rI E ORIENT IN THE LIGHT OF
I INTERNATIONAL LAW.
In 1&M9 the late William Edward Hall, an eminent international lawyer, in prefacing a treatise upon the subjectsaid: *J
therefore lxk forward with much misgiving to the manner in
which the next great war will be waged, but with no misgiving at
all as to the character of the rules which will be acknowledged ten
years after its termination, by comparison with the rules now considered to exist." I
Since that time the world has seen the Chinese-Japanese Var
(1894-1895). the Grzeco-Turkish War (1897), the SpanishAmerican War (1898), the British-Boer War (1899-i91 ), and
the Russo-Japanese War. which began February 6, i9o4, and is
just ended.
Of all these national struggles the last named may be truly
said to be the first great war, for while both the Spanish-American
and the British-Boer Wars were momentous conflicts, still, neither
had a valid claim to be considered of the first magnitude. Russia
and Japan. however. have played a game for enormous stakes;
Russia's preponderating influence in Manchuria, the Liao-tung
Peninsula. and Corea was risked on the one hand, while the very
existence of the Mikado's Empire was wagered on the other.
Although the war continued for only nineteen months, the
first part of Mr. I-all's prophecy was strikingly fulfilled and his
"isgiving'" amply justified. Both of the belligerents by their
actions have raised more questions upon points of international
law than probably ever before have occurred in a period of such
short duration. In order to discuss intelligently the various
breaches of international law which, so it is alleged, have taken
place since the war began, it is important to understand accurately
what that code of national good breeding which we call international law really is.
To comprehend international law as an institution we must
glance at its history.
'Preface to third eclititn of -A Treatise on International Law" by William
Edward Hall. M.A.. page x.
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In the days when Rome was mistress of the seas, from the
sunny shores of the Mediterranean to the chalky cliffs of Dover,
a special set of laws had been collated by her jurists for the settlement of disputes between aliens or between Romans and aliens.
These laws were made by comparing the customs and regulations
of all the principal Latin States and selecting therefrom- such
principles of right and justice as were universally acknowledged
among them. This collection was called the ]us Gentium. and as
a rivulet flowing from some tiny spring high up the mountain
widens into the mighty river which traverses the plain below, so
those usages and customs first sanctioned by the Jus Gentium
have formed, with their natural increments, the main current of
modern international law.2
Grotius, the father of this branch of jurisprudence, founded
his "'DeJure.Belli et Pacis" upon the principles of the Jus Gentium. And this was at a comparatively recent day when the hordes
of Attila and kindred chiefs were thought long before to have
swept away the legions, the art. and the learning of Imperial
3
Rome.
But as to-day the wanderer on the Roman Campagna sees
the ruined aqueducts of the Empire in silhouette against the
evening sky, so the student finds on every hand unmistakable evidence that the great maxims of the civil law, containing as they
(10 the germ of eternal truth, have endured through the years even
unto the present time.
During the Middle Ages a strong effort was made to identify
the law of nations with the Divine W\'ill as revealed in that system
known as Natural Law, and the advantage claimed for such a
course was the sanction afforded by the universal respect paid
by all nations to the Deity in whatever form recognized.
In more recent times another school has arisen which denies
absolutely the basic principle of the Divine Will as a controlling
influence of international law, and whose theory is that the law
of nations consists merely of a series of precedents in national
See ".ot. - on Internatimal Uaw." Eaton. pages 13. 14: "The Whewcll
Lecttircs on Intcrnational Iaw." by Henry Sumner Maine, K. C. S. I.. page 2o.
'Maine's "'\'hewell Lecturcs." pagC 2Z
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intercourse established by usage and custom between the powers
4
of the earth. A weakness of sanction is inherent in this theory.
Perhaps, however, the correct view is one occupying a middle
ground. That is to say, it seems to be true that international
law is founded upon ethical morality, but such morality is not

confinable by religious lines, its principles are as easily deduced
from the great maxims which experience has shown that man
must obey to conserve his well-being as from the Bible, the Koran,
or the works of Confucius. But although of moral foundation, it is only evidenced by actual occurrences, and it is from
the history of internatiorwI usage that we must ascertain the nature
of international law.
In a word, international law is a system of national relationship founded upon abstract morality, evidenced by usage, and
sanctioned by a national desire to conform to moral standards
and a national dread of coercion, both sentimental and physical,
at the hands of sister states.
The source of international law was the Roman Jus Gentium,
whose principles were assimilated in greater or less degree by
the barbarians and transmitted by them to the .Medixval nations.
The recorders of -international law have preserved, formed, and
to some extent changed it. They stretch in a long line from
Grotius to the present day. and include such names as Volf, Vattel, Philliniore, Twiss. Kent, Vheaton, Pomeroy, Holland, Laurence, and Hall. The codification of international law is of very
recent origin, and already it has exercised a greater influence upon
this department of jurisprudence than any other agency.
The regulations which control the intercourse of nations are
framed with regard to two conditions of national relationship,
peace and war. With the former condition this article has nothing to do, for every event of which it will treat springs of necessit) from the latter.
Vhat, then. do we understand by the existence of a state of
war?
'Unquestionably. we understand something very different
from the meaning which the phrase had for our forefathers.
IHaWs " ntt rniinal ".a"

introductory chapter.
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In the olden time war meant a tribal or national conflict
The persons and property of the belligerents were
l'outrancc.
6
at the absolute disposal of whichever happened to be the victor.
De.truction, desolation, and confiscation were inalienable incidents of war. For a long time the only effective restraining
influence was the system of chivalry, and in those barbarous
times the good resulting therefrom can scarcely be overestimated.
Chivalry inculcated the principles of fair play, of good faith.
between enemies, of protection for women and for the wounded
and the weak. The prototypes of the Table Round performed
a glorious mission by helping to subjugate the brutal instincts
of their fellows, the example of the noble Bayard had a like
effect, and it was not in vain that Roland wound his horn at
Roncesvalles!
But an even more powerful factor in the regulation and
modification of warfare was the interest of commercial enterprise. From the days.when the cities of the Hanseatic League
(lotted the coasts of Europe. and the great trading commonwealths
of Venice and Genoa battled for supremacy in the Adriatic and
in more distant seas. there has existed a strong sentiment for
peace based upon the opportunity for legitimate gain which that
condition affords.
Nothing is so inimical to trade as warfare.
Therefore, as the world's industrial progress became pronounced various limitations were placed by common consent upon
the thitherto unbridled license of war. The roll of the drum was
drowned by the whir of the loom. Then, too, advancing civilization made men more humane, and the theory of war has doubtless
been altered through merciful motives as well as through those
of commercial interest.
Grotius and the writers who succeeded him gave the earliest
expression of this restraining influence. But the struggle- was
long and hard, and it was not until comparatively recent times
that it was even measuirably successful. At so late a period
as the Napoleonic Wars England and France paralyzed trade by
prohibiting neutral commercial intercourse with each other.
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It remained for conventional international law to materially
lessen the rigors of war.
One of the first important steps taken in that direction was
the adoption of the famous Declaration of Paris by a majority of
Therein it was
the more important powers on April I. 1856
agreed that:
I. Privateering is and remains abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers enemies' goods, with the exception of contraband of war.
3. Neutral goods, with the exceptioi of contraband of
war, are not liable to capture under-enemy's flag.
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective,
that is to say. maintained by a force sufficient
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.
But it must not be supposcd that the contents of this epochmaking agreement were of novel impression. For many years
a code of rules governing the conduct of war had been in the
process of formulation through long usage and general consent,
and the Declaration of Paris merely gave expression to a few of
them.
This Declaratiton, however, was only a prelude. In 1863 a
number of persons representing private societies for the relief
of the wounded met in Geneva largely as the result of the sufferings endured through lack of proper hospital facilities during the
Italian War of 1859. The members of this Conference accomplished little beyond a general discussion of the subject, but
before they dispersed they induced the Swiss Government to call
a Diplomatic Congress of the powers to discuss the same ques- °
tion. This Congress met during the ensuing year and resulted
in the famous Geneva Convention of i864, which, briefly speaking, neutralized military ambulances and hospitals, whether belonging to the belligerents or to third parties, and the medical,
clerical, and administrative staffs attached thereto, and provided
for the inviolability of the wounded. It also ordained that those
persons. other than the wounded, for whom the convention was
Whcattn's *'nturnational Law.*- Appe~ndix G, page 8ft.
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framed, should claim its protection by displaying a white flag
'ith a red cross thereon (the flag of Switzerland, colors transposed), and by using the -ame emblem as a "brassard" or arm
badge."
In i868 the Swiss Government recalled the Congress at
Geneva to consider the advisability of revising the "Convention"
of 1864. Certain "additional articles" were adopted by the Congress, but as they were never tatified by th powers their effect
has been merely a moral one.4
The next international addition to the Code of War was
made in the same year (i868) by "The Declaration of St. Petersburg." Several bullets possessing explosive qualities till then
unknown had been offered to the Russian War Office for adoption. The Imperial Government, before initiating a means of
destruction so much more terrible than anything in existene,
called a military council of the powers -to see if such an instrument of warfare could not be eliminated through a general
agreement of abstention. The "Declaration" resulted, by which
the Signatory Powers "engage mutually to renounce in case of
war among themselves the employment by their military or naval
forces of any projectile of a weight below four hundred grammes
(approximately fourteen ounces), which is either explosive or
charged with fulminating or inflammable substance." *
All of these meetings were called to consider special questions relative to the conduct of war, but in 1874 Alexander II,
Czar of Russia. called an International Conference at Brussels
for the purpose of codifying the whole subject. A long declaration of fifty-six articles was drafted by the Conference, but the
time was not yet ripe for such an agreement, and while great
attention was paid in all civilized countries to the result of the
7
Conference the declaration was never ratified.
It may not be out of place at this point to call attention to
national matters which are, however, of international
purely
two
Th" L.aws and Custon. of War on Land," by T. E. Holland, K. C., page
51 et seq.. appcndix.
t. Studies in International Law," Holland, page 61.
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importance in this regard. I refer to the British and American
E-nlistment Acts and to the American doctrine of the immunity
during wartime of private property on the high seas.
The Enlistment Acts were adopted by both countries as a
sequel to the Alabama claims agitation in 187o and 1871, and they
make it an "offence" and a "high misdemeanor" for the citizens
of either to enter the military or naval service of a belligerent
state with whoni their country is at peace, or to fit out or engage
in expeditions whose object is the assistance of such a belligerent.*
Immunity for private property on the high seas was first
provided for in the treaty made between the United States and
Prussia in t785. Since that time it has become a settled doctrine
of American policy and was urged by this country for inclusion
in the Declaration of Paris and The Hague Convention.- It found,
perhaps. its most reasonable *expression in the treaty negotiated
between the United States and Italy in 1871, where the corollary
is wisely added "that this exemption shall not extend to vessels
and their cargoes which may attempt to enter a port blockaded
by the naval forces of either party." 9
After all these attempts to adopt a modified and uniform
systein of warfare a final effort was made at the close of the
nineteenth century which was fated to result in a partial but,
nevertheless, substantial success.
On August 24. 1898, Nicholas II, the present Tsar of Russia. suggLsted the Peace Conference at The Hague, and its sessions began on the ioth of May of the ensuing year. It is
undoubtedly true that the Conference tried to accomplish too
much, and in fact accomplished too little. But even so, the conventions finally agreed upon were a long stride in advance of
any previous international regulations. True, the plan for the
limitation of armaments failed utterly, and many minor points,
such as the American doctrine of inmunity for private property
at sea, were merely proposed as subjects of a future meeting.
but notwithstanding such disappointments, the Conference
'Wheaton t furth English Edition). Appendix C. pages 757,,74
" The Pecace C nitrnce at The 11aguc," Holls, page 3o9.
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adopted three conventions which were afterwards generally ratified, and which provided in brief:
i. For the systematization of international arbitration
and the establishment at The Hague of a permanent court for the adjustment of international
disputes.
2. For the issuance of instructions by the Signatory
Powers to their armed land forces in conformity
with certain "Regulations Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land" adopted by the
Conference and modelled by it upon the unratified Declaration of the Bruassels Conference of
1874.
3. For the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22.
1864."0
To discuss the subject of these conventions would require
much more space than is at my disposal, and I can only say that
frequent reference will be made to their terms in considering the
concrete examples involving the principles they represent, which
'have been supplied during the progress of the war.
The ratification of The Hague agreement has been the last
united act of the powers with regard to the revision, affirmation,
and establishment of the great principles of international law.
Fate seems to have acted with more than usual irony in decreeing the occurrence of the Boer War and the mighty conflict we
are now discussing while the great Peace Conference is still a
vivid memory. However, it seems really fortunate, since so
many of the points actually agreed to by the Conference related
to war, and to peace not at all, that opportunities should be
afforded so soon for testing the meaning and efficacy of the regulations adopted by it.
It may easily be seen, therefore, that the present is an especially favorable time for the solution of questions of international
law relating to war. We have a mass of historical precedents
'"

The Peace Conference at The Hague," by Dr. Holls.
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for purposes of comparison, we havk a long list of eminent
authors of approved authority for purposes of reference, and,
finally, we have a new and untried Code framed with reference
to the precedents, the authors, and numerous other attempts at
codification, which needs more than anything else the crucial
test of practical application.
Let us now examine the various events of the RussoJapanese War which have raised questions relevant either to this
Code or to the general principles of international law.
In our examination of events it would seem advisable to
segregate them for consideration into classes in each of which

the occurrences bear a certain generic resemblance to one another; that is to say, we shall consider:
I. The general question raised by Russia's objection to
Japan's initiation of hostilities without a formal
declaration of war.
2. Problems of land warfare as affecting (A) the belligerents, and (B) the belligerents and neutrals.
3. Problems of maritime warfare as affecting (A) the
belligerents, and (B) the belligerents and neu-.
trals.
With regard to the question raised by the commencement
of hostilities the facts seem to be as follows: In December, 19o3,
the protracted negotiations between St. Petersburg and Tokio
were obviously approaching a crisis. On December 25th Japan
reiterated her demand that Russia recognize the territorial integrity and independence of China and Korea. This demand was
answered in a qualified and negative manner on January 6, 19o4.
Japan made a last appeal on January 13 th, and no answer having
been made thereto prior to February 5 th, she on that date demanded the passports of her Minister to Russia. On the same
date Russia recalled Baron Rosen from Tokio. This was the
exact state of affairs on February 8th. when, to quote from "The
Annual Register," "the Russian fleet lying outside the harbor
(of Port Arthur) was attacked by Japanese torpedo boats, when
the battleships Retvizan and Tsarevitch and cruiser Pallada were
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severely datuagzed. Tile attack was repeated in the night, and in
tile morning the Japanese fleet engaged the Russian squadron and
the forts near the entrance to the harbor. The battleship Poltava and the cruisers Diana. Askold. anti Novik suffered considerably, and the Japanese fleet withdrew, having in twenty-four
hours so weakened the Russian squadron that the landing of
Japanese forces in Korea could be proceeded with without fear
of interruption." "I
The result of this engage.ment was that Russia denounced
Japan as a treacherous foe '2 for beginning the war without any
warning either in the form of declaration or manifesto. Russi-,'.denunciation was conveyed to the world through thc Car's address to the officers of his navy on Fcbruary ioth and the official
circular of the Foreign Office issued on February 22d.
The legal point involved is therefore clearly defined; -was
Japan guilty of a b, each of international law because of the way
in which she began the war?
To answer this question we must consider it historically.
A formal declaration of war held an important place in the code
of chivalry. It was the custom of a monarch who intended to
enter into a conflict with another state to send a herald resplendent
in all the varicolored panoply pertaining to his station to proclaim to the sovereign thereof his master's will.- Even as late as
1635 France declared war against Spain at Brussels according
to all the heraldic forms of the Middle Ages.
Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the
rule requiring a formal declaration of war before the commencement of hostilities has been more honored in the breach than in
the observance. A few modern instances, airanged in tabular
form, will illustrate this assertion.

Xl..

The Amnual Register" for 1904, page 375-

The Japancse contend that the first shot of the war was fired at Admiral
Togos fleet as it passed Chemulpo. Korea, on February 8th by the Russian
gunboat Korietz.
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HOW COM3M*rC2

By declaratica."
France dcc:arcd war July iS. z87o: first engagemunt at S;arbruck August 2i 1870M"
By invasion of Turkey by Russian army a short
time bifrc Russia declared war.r
By military
* tiperations without formal declaration
of war. I
By A.nking of Oiincse troopship b Japan a moth
before war was declared"

(3834)
!ig8u)

Crimean.
Franco-Prussian.

(OF77)

Russo-Turkish.

(3885)

Franco-Chinese.

( 894)

Chintsc'Japanese.

(3897)

Grzco-Turkish.

By engagement on April 8. 1897. war bein de-

(898)
ci899)

Spanish-American.
British-Boer.

dared April iW7h."
By declaration.m
By ultimatum on mthe part of the Doers amouathw
to a declaratio ."

This table shows that the wars begun without formality have
generally been those in which one of the belligerents was a semicivilized nation, and it is interesting to note that in such cases
the civilized state has generally lxn the aggressor.
Writers of authority are a good deal at variance on this
subject.2" but there seeis to be a consensus of opinion that while
preccdInt to a certain extent excuses the commencement of
hostilities without a formal declaration of war or the more
esoteric mnethod of publishing a manifesto, still, fair play and the
business interests of neutral nations demand that a definite time
shall be fixed by the belligerents themselves as the starting-point
of their controversy, and the only accurate and satisfactory way
of fixing such time is by some kind of a declaration of war made
prior to any military or naval operations whatsoever.'
X"heatonis "Internastionl Law." fourth English edition, page 419.
"Whcaton's " International Law," fourth English edition, page.419; HaWs
- International Law," page 383.
a Philimore's "International Law." vol K
6.
"The Annual Register" for zS88
I " History of the 'ar Between China and Japan," by J. I. Oska. chapters
Iand a
"The Annual Register" for 1897.
"A History of the American People." by Woodrow Vilson, volume V.
page 274.
"-Towards Prctoria." by Julian Ralph. Part 11, p. 3.
lall's - International Law." page 381 i Seq.
"The rramns which rend.er a ulclaration of war imperative are lrgel y
historical.-hie memo~ry %f tlw uedi:xval herald is still with us.--but in addition
thereto there is the right which nrutrals have to know from exactly what date
they may d-al in " cotraband " at their peril.
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It is idle to argue that war had been practically declared
through the breaking off of diplomatic relations. It is quite
conceivable in principle that severed diplomatic relations may be
land
hence this argument, which seeks to employ the
resumtd,
rcasoning of the well-known geometrical axiom, that "things
eq(ual to the same thing are equal to each other." fails utterly.
Rus:ia's possible random shot (Korietz) does not challenge
serious consideration, the real question is as to the legality of
Togo*s brilliant naval raid, and of that we can only say that
while it is certainly excused by precedent it is just as certainly
condemned by principle.
Such a problem which has arisen several times
Publems o
Land Warfare during the war is that of alleged mutilation of the
Affecting the
e ligerents (lead. lEach side has accused the other of this pecuway
liarly revolting and atrocious action. It is hard to
believe newspaper reports upon such a sulsject, and did they stand
alone we might dismiss them from consideration, but such a
well-known war correspondent and author as Frederick Palmer
has. spoken of such mutilation as an assured fact. 2 It eems,
therefore, ju:tifiable to accept the resulting question provisionally
and to assume its truth merely for the purpose of considering the
legal point which it involves.
It is impossible to deal with this matter except in a negative way, for respect to the dead is one of the foundation-stones
of the edifice of human civilization. A modem general would
as soon adopt the torture stake as show disrespect to the inanimate remains of a gallant foe. In all the long catalogue of cruel
and unjustifiable actions which mark the reign of Charles II
none is so generally reprobated as the disinterment of Cromwell
and his associates and the exposure of their bodies in chains, followed by decapitation and burial at Tyburn.
The Hague Convention prohibits the employment of treachery or poison to kill the enemy and forbids the refusal of quarter.
It also throws over the sick and wounded, like a sheltering man"-With Kuroki in Manchuria." by Frederick Palmer, pages

173 and 174.
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tle, the merciful provisions of the Geneva Convention.3' Its very
silence upon the point under examination, when considered in relation to the declarations just mentioned, makes it clear that the
framers failed to contemplate an act of such gross barbarity as
an incident of modern warfare. In concluding this most unpleasant topic we may lie certain that if any such acts are ever
provable they will remain for centuries an ineffaceable blot upon
the escutcheon of the guilty nation, and, furthermore, thev will
constitute a fair ground for subsequent claims, through diplomatic channels, on behalf of the outraged families of the victims.
On February to. i9o4. the day Japan formally declared
war, the United States of America, through her Secretary ofState. John Hay, issued the following "Note," which
Problems e
Land warfare was sent to our representatives accredited to the belas AffedIaZ
ligerent nations and copies of it "to all the powers
Belligerents
signatory of the Protocol of Pekin requesting each
and NeutrasI
of them to make similar representations to Russia and Japan:
"You will express to the 'Minister of Foreign Affairs the
earnest desire of the Government of the United States that in
the cour.- of the military operations which have begun between
Russia and Japan, the neutrality of China and in all practicable
ways her administrative entity, shall be respected by both parties,
and that the area of hostilities shall be localized and limited as
much as possible. so that undue excitement and disturbance of
the Chinese people may be prevented and the least possible loss
to the commerce and peaceful intercourse of the world may be
occasioned." 2
Japan's reply was received on the i 3 th, and Russia's on the
19th of February. Each nation promised to respect "the neutrality and administrative entity of China" if its opponent faithfully
observed the same."'
On January 13, 1905, Count Cassini, the Russian Ambas"The Laws and Customs of War on Land." by T. E. Holland; K. C.,
page &

' Correspondence in rc Russo-Japanese War published by the Department of
State.
- See note 25.
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sador at Washington, addressed a letter to Secretary Hay in
which he accused China of frequent breaches of neutrality and
Japan of disregarding the above-mentioned agreement. T
A long correspondence ensued to which Secretary Hay,
Count Cassini. and the Japanese and Chinese foreign offices were
parties. All of Russia's statements were denied and counter
charges made. Both of the belligerents threatened to disregard
their original agreement, but-and this is the important factexcept in isolated and comparatively insignificant instahces neither
did so. No army of either side marched through Chinese territory, none of that territory was pre-empted for purposes of war
or aggrandizement. The statu quo -of "The Middle Kingdom"
was maintained-in this time of unusual stress as a result of the
definite, straight forward, and forcible policy of the American
Government.
But the facts just stated, while they show how China has
been protected by the United States in this war, do not explain
the necessity for such protection. nor do they make it clear why
this country should enter the lists as China's champion. To
comprehend the reason therefor it is necessary to review briefly
the historical relations of China with the Western Powers. It
may seem that such a review is not germane to this article, but
one needs only to remembner that the policy of the United States
with regard to China has been one of the most important events
in international relations which the war has brought about in
order to realize that a discussion of the historical development of
this policy is not only relevant, but indeed necessarily incident
to a comprehension of the conflict from the viewpoint of the
international lawyer.
The 5th of July, I84o, marks an epoch in the history of the
Chinese Empire. For centuries upon centuries the inhabitants
of that vast portion of Asia comprised within its boundaries had
led an esoteric existence, hedged in by a moral wall far more
impenetrable than the wonderful one of stone which winds its
Corrcepnindence betwevn the Russian Ambassador and the Secretary
'.See
of State, published by the Department of State.
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sinuous way over the hills and valleys of the land. In the words
of Justin McCarthy, "The one thing which China asked of European civilization and the thing called Modern Progress was to be
let alone. Clhina's prayer to Europe was that of Diogenes to
Alexander-'Stand out of my sunshine.' " -8
Cfina had no desire to acquire the civilization of the West.
Indeed, she regarded it as the perfection of barbarism. Through
the hereditary tendencies of her people as expressed in the writings of her sages and philosophers she had produced a wonderful
civilization of her own and one differing in almost every particular from that of Christendom. It was objective in its relation to existence, it inculcated many excellent principles, but it
recommended a life of negation devoted mainly to the acquisition
of learning, philosophical contemplation, and amcestid worship.
Such a people could not but look with aversion upon the
nervous energy and utilitarianism of Europe and America. For
many years every effort on the part of the Christian states to
establish commercial relations with China was diefeated by the
Chinese. Then came the Opium War, which began on the date
before alluded to "' and ended on August 29. 1842. when a treaty
of peace was signed by the belligerents.
The immediate casus belli was discreditable to England.
for the war resulted from her refusal to prohibit the East India
Company from trading in opimn with the Chinese despite the fact
that the dnig was admittedly poisonous and of moral destructivity, and, furthermore, had been excluded from China by the law
3
of the land. *
The indirect cause, however. was China's policy of exclusion. which England saw could be overcome only by force of
arms. and the result was the dislodgment of the first stones in
what Mr. Foster aptly calls "China's crumbling wall." .'
By the terms of the treaty the ports of Canton. Amoy,
A History tof Our Own Times,- by Justin McCarthy, volume I. page a3.

'

"July S. 1840.

American Diplomacy in the Orient'"ky Jum Foster, page 65.
Foster. chapter vii. page 203.
-
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Foo-Chow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were opened to British trade
and residence, a large indemnity was paid by China, Hong-Kong
was ceded to England, and a tariff was agreed upon.3 - At this
early date the United States initiated the policy it has since pursued, of reaping advantages from- the military operations of
sister states, while itself maintaining friendly relations with the
Chinese Government. Commodore Kearny secured for the citizens of America an equal participation with those of England
in the tariff concessions .guaranteed by the treaty.
From this time on history records constant efforts on the
part, chiefly, of England. France, Russia, and America to extend
and amplif, their commercial privileges in "The Flowery Kingdom."
The.United States negotiated the treaties of 1844, 1858.
1868, 88o, 1888 (unratified), 1894, and was a party to Chinas
treaty with the powers in i9ot. The treaty of 1844 secured to
us in an official form even more liberal concessions than the
British had obtained two years earlier.23
The next fourteen years witnessed a series of desperate attempts by China to evade her treaty obligations. Every trick
and subterfuge known to the Oriental mind was employed, and
fraud and prevarication were freely used to prevent the observance of these sworn agreements.
This course of action led to the second Anglo-Chinese War
in 5858, at the end of which the United States shareil in the
fruits of victory, as she had done before. Then for the first
time were the foreign diplomatic representatives promised that
they should be allowed to come into personal toqch with the
Chinese Emperor. As was to be expected, the terms of all the
treaties negotiated by the powers in4 1858 were far more liberal
than those of former conventions.
History of Our Own Times." McCarthy, page r3q.

mFoster. page 87.

"Mr. l,ist-r says at page 242 of his book: "The four treaties. negotiated
separ.aely. haw a g.neral similarity in their .-tipulations. and as each contains
the "most faw,rcel natiun" cl.a' . the special stipulations of any became effective
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Ten years later Anson Burlingame, the retiring Minister of
the United States to China. was commissioned by the Emperor

as Special Ambassador to the Foreign Powers, and commenced
one of the nost picture.ue and spectacular missions recorded in
the annals of diplomacy. Attended by a semi-barbarous retiniue
resplendent in the varicolored trappings of the Orient. he journeyed to Washington. Iondon. Berlin. and St. Petersburg, where
death brought his progress to a close. Burlingame was a man
p'issessing great personal magnetism and considerable ability.
In Eastern affairs he was arn optimist, and belie-cd that with
equal treatment and opportunity China would soon take her place
in the family of civilized nations. His purpose was to secure a

general revision of the treaties of' 1858 in ways favorable to
China.
The best result of his labors was the treaty of z868, which.
he negotiated between China and the United States. .
The suhs uent treaties of I88o and 1894 have dealt with the
probleIn of excluding coolie labor from this country. They form
the only serious impediment in a lng series of friendly relations.
for all the powers. The important features of the Treaties of Tientsin of t858
,)ver those of 0S41 and 1844 were t1- ctcssiims, first., as to diplhmatic pririlcges. second, as to enlarged track-and travel, and, third. as to religiots toleratioL

Direct erins of access to the government were provided, and the right of visit
and residence of diplomatic rcprv.-ntativ s at Peking was secured. The stipulations as to trade, travel, residence, ownership of property, duties. etc.. which bad

proved so dt-fcctive or inefficitlly enforced under the earlier treaties were
enlarged and made more specific iii their terms7 It may he of interest to note
here that perhaps the greatest stumbling-block to diplomatic interctrse with
China was her dtmanl that foreign diplhmats should prostrate themslves, or at
least how the knee, to the Emperor. As tate as 1873 the question came up, ad
in his instructions to our minister, the Secretary of State then said "that while
questions of ceremony were not usually scriously considered in the United

States, in the case of China it involved the official equality of naticns and became
a que.-stin, not of form merelv, but of substance., requiring grave consideration,"
This was said because had our minister kneeled the Chinese would have considered and attempted to treat the United States as a tributary nation. As a matter
of fact the Emperor dl not receive the diphmats in audience until t87& when
the' were prescnted in an tsatirfactory way. A somewhat more dignified
audenw was accorded then in :2qt. Blut only since the punitive expedition of
tItK have they been treated with the courtesy which is their due.

I Fo-ster, pages 265. 66.
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To sum up the facts of history: The United States has never
declared war against China; instead, she has allowed other nations, notably England and France. to do the fighting while she
held.aloof and shared with them the fruits of victory so far as
trade privileges were concerned. The United States never tried
to force the opium traffic uln China, but. instead, helped her to
suppress it.anti finally, in i88o, prohibited its importation by
citizens of the United States.36
The United States pxossessed in Anson Burlingame a Minister who wielded an enormous influence over the Chinese and
inspired in them an abiding feeling of amity towards us which
he cemented by negotiating on their behalf the liberal treaty of
1868. Finally, of late years this country alone has showed a
disinterested desire to treat China fairly. \Ve represented her
in Japan in 1894. and it is a recent memoiy that after the Boxer
outbreak in i9oo we asked merely reasonable money compensation. and not only refused to join the other powers in their land
grabbing and treasury looting performances. hut used our best
efforts to modify their demands and control their rapacious greed.
For all these things China is not ungrateful, she looks to us
as her best friend. and we on our part in intervening in her behalf
merely carried a settled diplomatic policy to its logical conclusion.
Our motives, it is true, were not entirely altruistic, though
none can deny that we stand for fair play and common honesty
among the nations, but, besides the question of fairness, the
United States in issuing the circular of February io. i9o4 . had
clearly in mind the necessity for maintaining the integrity of the
Chinese Empire in order to secure freedom of trade to all nations,
commonly known as "the open door." This country could not
but view with alarm the gradual territorial encroachments of the
E-uropean powers in recent years. With the French in Cochin
China, the English at Wei--lai-XVei, and the Gernans at Kiau
Chau, not to mention numerous other settlements, it was felt
" Foster, page 295.
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that the Russo-Japanese War would afford an opportunity not
only to the belligerents but to neutral states for territorial aggression, and perhaps even for denationalization of the great, tottering Empire of the East.
America, therefore, spoke in clarion tones, and to her everlasting credit preserved inviolate and unharmed, throughout a
world crisis, an ancient nation which for many years has figured
among the powers of the earth as a lamb among wolies.
The next question for consideration is that involved in the
landing of troops by Japan at Won-San and Chemulpo, Korea,
on February 16, 19o4. Of the illegality of this proceeding there
is no doubt. Wheaton says: "The rights of war can be exercised
only within the territory of the belligerent powers, upon the high
seas, or in a territorybelonging to no one. Hence it follows that
hostilities cannot lawfully be exercised within the territorial
jurisdiction of the neutral state, which is the common friend of
both parties. This exemption extends to the passage of an army
or fled through the limits of the territorial jurisdiction, which
can hardly be considered an innocent passage, such as one nation
has a right to demand from another." "
It is earnestly contended by Japanese apologists that it is
farcical to regard Korea as an independent state; that she was
in fact, the gage of battle, and that it was a necessary military
measure to occupy her territory and oust the Russians from it
because Korea's national identity depends entirely on the.state
who. by force of arms, is able to preponderate in her affairs, and
hence she may be Russian to-day, Japanese to-morrow, but Korean
never.
As a statement of facts the above argument is pretty nearly
correct, but are these facts such as the international lawyer can
regard? Obviously they are not. The Kingdom of Korea is,
and always has been, a theoretically independent state, so far as
its foreign relations are concerned."a That it is really subject

" Wheaton'- ""Internationat Iaw." page s,&
SP"oster. chapter ix.
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to domination by other states is purely adventitious, and therefore we must regard the use which Japan has made of it to facilitate the debarkation and passage of her troops to the scene of war
as a technical violation of a well-established principle, which,
howcver, may have been morally justified by reason of Korea's
weakness, lack of national identity, and her character as bone of
contention between the belligerents.
There is probably no class of persons connected with warfare which causes so much anxiety and annoyance to the belligerents, and yet is of such international importance, as the representatives of the press.
In the days of Archibald Forbes and his confreres the war
correspondent had a comparatively free foot. There was some
attempt at cen-_orship, but. on the whole, he might go where he
liked, see what he pleased. and report what he could. Even as
recently as the British-Boer War we find a large number of
efficient writers in the field, to whom both sides gave ample opportunity to pursue their work. But things have been very
different during the Russo-Japanese War.
The smoke of Togo's guns had hardly "rollcd from -Port
Arthur on the evening of his fateful raid when the cables--the
nerves of the world-were bearing many curt messages to far-off
lands. Back they came, the correspondents, from India, China.
and the Philippines; others roused themselves from the comforts
of life in London, Paris. and New York, and in an incredibly
short space of time a large detachment was speeding towards
Tokio. while another section hastened towards the Russian headquarters in Manchuria.
Trouble began immediately; the suave Japanese did everything for the correspondents except let them sei the war. . There
was a long succession of heart-breaking delays before they were
allowed to start at all. When they did airive in Manchuria they
were carefully guarded at all times and permitted to move only

in a certain restricted area. They were allowed to see small and
unimportant parts of battles from distant hilltops, and it was not
unusual for a Japanese officer to call them together and with the
aid of a blacklard and interpreter to explain a glorious victory

2
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which had occurred some time before, and which, except in this
ingeniously vicarious way, they had no opportunity to see.36
So far as the correspondents accompanying their armies were
concerned the Russians showed no disposition to reduce their
privileges beyond the usual limit, but the Japanese policy just
referred to has raised a very important international question,
namely, to what extent may a nation control war correspondents
accompanying its armies?
There is no question that a state may control its own correspondents pretty completely, but the control of the correspondents of neutral nations presents a different proposition.
Of course, in the present instance Japan justified everything
she did on the ground of military -necessity, but there is little
reason to doubt that she exaggerated such necessity, and imposed
so many restrictions upon the correspondents that in many instances they were unable to report anything except at second hand.
It would seem, however, that as international law stands
to-day Japan acted quite within her rights. A correspondent
belonging to a neutral nation who obtains permission to accompany the army of a belligerent to the seat of war becomes himself
a unit of the force, and must Obey without question the orders
of the commanding general. So completely is he recognized as
an integral part of the army to which he is attached that Article
13 of The Hague Convention regarding "The Laws and Customs
of \Var" reads as follows: "Individuals who follow an army
without directlv belonging to it-such as newspaper correspondents and reporters, sutlers and contractors-who fall into the
enemny's hands, and whom the latter see fit to detain, have a
right to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they can prcduce
a certificate from the military authorities of the army which they
were accompanying." 40
'sc e

"F-tllowing the Sun Flag," by John Fox. and " With Kuroki in Man-

churia.- by Frcderick Palmer.
' The Pcace Conference at The Hague," Holls. page 14
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And Mr. Atlay in his note to Hall's International Law ,

says: "Mr. Bluntschli, the American instructions, and the Project
of Declaration (of Brussels) include correspondents of newspapers among persons liable to be made prisoners of war.

Prob-

ably it is only meant that they may be detained if their detention
is recommended for special reasons. All persons. however, can
be made prisoners for special reasons; newspxtper correspondents
in general seem hardly to render sufficiently direct service to justifv their detention as a matter of course, and they are quite as
often embarrassing to the army which they accompany as to -its
eneny. Perhaps it is unfortunate that they are enumerated as
subjects of belligerent right together with persons who are always
detained. The 'Manual of the Institut de Droit International'
(Art. 22) directs that newspaper correspondents shall be detained
for so long only as military necessity may dictate.".
Mr. Atlay unquestionably has the right idea with regard to
the status of correspondents, and the terms of The Hague Convention should be interpreted in accordance with his view.
That is to say, the phrase which gives correspondents the
"'right" to be treated as prisoners of war was evidently framed
for their protection, probably to avoid their classification as spies
under certain circumstances, but was not intended to make them
an integral part oi the belligerent army which they happen to
accompany.
Notwithstanding, however, the probable intention of the
framers of the convention, its effect, coupled with usage, has
been to subject correspondents to discipline almost as severe as
that governing the troops they follow, and to identify them with
the force to which they are attached, for in order to enjoy the
privileges of prisoners of war which the convention guarantees
to them, they are rendered liable to the same hardships of capture and imprisonment which are the natural lot of the belligerents, and of the belligerents alone.
The correspondent to-day is laboring under two difficulties,
Hall's International Law, page 4o7.
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namely, the absolute control of the general he accompanies, and
a status, in. case of capture, identical with that of a belligerent.
It is clear that the first difficulty ought never to be removed,
but there is much to be said in favor of its modification. Wlhile
the true military necessity of a belligerent state often calls for
the suppression of information regarding its land and naval
forces, still, it is not conceivable that such necessity should decree
a system of press garroting and unbroken secrecy. It is not for
the sake of idle curiosity that such men as the late Julian Ralph
and G. W. Stevens give their lives, but from a far nobler motive.
The world has a right to know the principal events of a great
war just as they take place. Were this not the case a powerful
state might overwheln a weak neighbor and the rest of the earth
be none the wiser. A war waged in silence is a harmful, a dangerous, war. It will be an important question for the next Hague
Conference to decide whether warfare shall not be surrounded
by the utmost publicity compatible with the military exigencies
of the belligerents, and by what rules and regulations such a
result can be secured.
The second difficulty can be removed with little trouble by
simply following out Mr. Atlay's thought and safeguarding corresjondents not by putting them on the same footing as the belligerents. but by partly or wholly neutralizing them, just as surgeons and chaplains were neutralized by the Geneva Convention.
It is not a far cry from war correspondents to the instruments of their craft, and the questions connected with ocean
cables and wireless telegraphy are especially interesting because
of recent origin.
The Paris Convention of March 14. 1884, protects submarine cables outside of territorial waters during times of peace,
but there is not as yet an international agreement safeguarding
them in time of war.
There was little or no interference with cables (luring the
war, but that this was so was merely adventitious and it would

THE WAR IN TIHE ORIENT.

seem wise to restrict the power of belligerents so that except in
cases of the most urgent military necessity ncutral cables at least
42
shall be inviolable.
Wireless telegraphy, the infant of the world of science, gave
rise to two noteworthy discussions. When Nogi was drawing
his net of flame closely about stricken Port Arthur messages of
vital importance to the garrison were flitting daily through the
seemingly impenetrable cordon of the besieging army. A word
from Major Seaman, an American surgeon who was in the
Chinese port of Chefoo at the time, goes far towards explaining
the mystery: "Almost within sight of Consuilar Hill stood a
building. . . . It was the headquarters of the wireless telegraph station established and used by Russia. I have heard the
pulsations of the dynamos whereby electrical communication was
maintained between Port Arthur and the Russian Consulate in
Chefoo. That building -was less than ten. miles from Chefoo,
much less, and a report of its establishment and working may be
found on file in certain government archives."s
How do such actions on the part of China square with her
alleged position as a neutral power? The answer se~ems very simple. Professor Holland says: "A state is neutral which chooses
to take no part in a war, and persons and property are called
neutral which belong to a state occupying this position." 44 Surely
the maintenance of such a station was a gross breach of neutrality
on China's part. She could hardly be said to be taking no part
in the war when a spot in her territory formed a necessary link
in that strange, invisible chain over which the beleaguered garrison flashed news of their condition and prayers for aid. In future
wars it would seem that "wireless" stations should be as carefully watched and treated in the same manner as the ordinary
telegraph and cable lines of the belligerents.
But the most surprising development in connection with
wireless telegraphy arose during April, 1904, when Admiral
Wheaton (fourth English EDition). page 722.
- From Tokio through Manchuria with the Japanese," Seaman, page 177.
- Studies in International Law," Holland. page 27t.
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Alexieff. the Czar's Viceroy in Manchuria, induced his Government to issue a circular to the powers which read as follows:
"Iam instructed by my Government, in order that there may be
no misunderstanding,. to inform your Excellency that the Lieutenant of his Imperial Majesty in the Far East has just made
the following declaration: "Incase neutral vessels, having on
board correspondents who may communicate news to the.enemy
by means of improved apparatus not yet provided for by existing
conventions should be arrested off Kwang-tung or within the zone
of operations of the Russian fleet, such correspondents shall be
regarded as spies. and the vessels provided with such apparatus
shall be seized as lawful prizes.'"
It is true that it has been asserted that the word "are" was
used in the above circular instead of "may" before "communicating," and if such was the case Russia would have been justified
in making offending correspondents prisoners of war, but under
no circumstances would she have had any justification or authority for treating them as spies.
Article 29 of The Hague Convention on The Laws and Custonis of War declares that: "An individualcan only be considered a spy if, acting clandestinely, or under false pretences, he
obtains, or seeks to obtain, information in the zone of operations
of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the
hostile party." 4'

Now Russia was signatory to the above article, and how
she can reconcile her circular with the definition of a spy therein
contained passes human understanding. Correspondents, especially those on press-boats, act openly and without any deceit in
gathering news, and their despatches are conveyed to the outside
world over neutral cables. There is no case on record of a
reputable correspondent taking advantage of his position in relation to one belligerent to assist another. The fact that "wireless"
is used by a correspondent is apparently sufficient to make him
a spy. so we must attribute all the necessary facts of the definition
to the silent child of De Forrest and Marconi. This is. of course.
" Wheaton (fourth English Edition), page 559.
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ridiculou', and it puts the circular in its true light. The truth
is that Russia in this remarkable document was merely giving
vent to her spleen against England by threatening, under the
flimsiest of pretexts, to. hang the correspondent of tile London
Times, who was then cruising near the seat of war on a boat
equipped with a "wireless" outfit.
Obvious though its purpose was, the circular should not be
allowed to pass without strong rebuke, for it sought, in terms at
least, to legalize a gross infraction of international law.
In a subsequent article we shall consider problems connected
with the maritime warfare of Russia and Japan.
Theodore J. Crabvson.

